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WHEN ROBOTS MAKE LEGAL MISTAKES
SUSAN C. MORSE*

Abstract
The questions presented by robots’ legal mistakes are examples of the
legal process inquiry that asks when the law will accept decisions as final,
even if they are mistaken. Legal decision-making robots include market
robots and government robots. In either category, they can make mistakes
of undercompliance or overcompliance. A market robot’s overcompliance
mistake or a government robot’s undercompliance mistake is unlikely to be
challenged. On the other hand, government enforcement can challenge a
market robot’s undercompliance mistake, and an aggrieved regulated party
can object to a government robot’s overcompliance mistake. Robots will
have an incentive to make decisions that will avoid the prospect of
challenge, especially if they cannot defend their legal decisions due to a
lack of explainability. This incentive could encourage counterintuitive
results. For instance, it could encourage market robots to overcomply and
government robots to undercomply with the law.
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Introduction
This Essay is concerned with what happens when robots make legal
mistakes. When an automated intelligent system makes a legal mistake, will
it stand as a valid and final interpretation of the law?
A robot, like any legal decision maker, has to defend decisions only
when those decisions are challenged. And not all decisions are equally open
to challenge. As it stands now, some robot legal decisions might be
challenged as unlawful. Others will not be. I argue here that, all else equal,
robot legal decision makers will prefer decisions that are less vulnerable to
challenge. This may cause the development of the law to drift in new and
different directions.
As Henry Hart and Albert Sacks observed and taught,1 legal process
helps determine when to respect an institution’s production of law. Some of
these procedures for challenging decisions could change in response to
artificial intelligence, since the rules we have do not necessarily line up
with the robot capabilities we predict. For example, consider prosecutors
and defense lawyers. As one paper in this issue observes, artificial
intelligence systems, or robots, might eventually act as prosecutors and
defense lawyers in criminal cases.2 The job of a prosecutor might require
more moral judgment when deciding whom to prosecute, for instance,
compared to the single-minded zealous advocacy of a defense lawyer.
Other contributions to this issue might take this example and suggest that
robots’ discretionary or moral prosecutorial decisions should be more open
to challenge than the similar decisions of human prosecutors.3 Perhaps, in
the future, law will establish an avenue to challenge prosecutorial discretion
decisions made by robots. But this would be a change from existing law.

1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 3-9 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (discussing the idea of institutional settlement and the interaction between
private and government decision-making).
2. See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Should Robots Prosecute and Defend?, 72
OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2019).
3. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Artificial Wisdom? A Potential Limit on AI in Law
(and Elsewhere),72 OKLA. L. REV. 51 (2019); Chris Chambers Goodman, AI/Esq: Impacts of
Artificial Intelligence in Lawyer-Client Relationships, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 147 (2019); W.
Bradley Wendel, The Promise and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of
Law, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 21 (2019).
THE
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My goal here is not to propose changes that would make it easier to
challenge robot legal decisions. Instead, I use existing law and existing
process to illustrate the interaction between available legal process and the
content of robots’ legal decisions, and to argue that, all else equal, robots
will prefer to make legal decisions that are less likely to be challenged. The
perspective here is ex post and focused on review of robot decisions.4
The analysis can be illustrated by considering both a government robot
and a market robot.5 An example of a government robot that makes legal
decisions is an automated system, developed or purchased by the
government, that determines an applicant’s eligibility for welfare or
disability benefits. An example of a private-market robot is an automated
system, such as TurboTax, that generates tax returns.
In the case of the government robot that determines welfare benefits, a
decision might overcomply with the law, for instance by demanding
unnecessary information before granting benefits. A welfare applicant
illegally denied benefits might challenge this overcompliance decision.6
However, decisions that undercomply with the law, for instance by granting
benefits without all of the legally required information, will not be
challenged. The recipient of the benefit has no reason to challenge the
government’s undercompliance, and no one else has standing to do so.

4. In contrast, I would characterize the ideas of certifying robots proposed in one of
this volume’s papers as an ex ante idea. Susan Saab Fortney, Online Legal Document
Providers and the Public Interest: Using a Certification Approach to Balance Access to
Justice and Public Protection, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 91 (2019). Another paper proposes using
robots to review human decisions, while my take is the other way around and focuses on
human review of robot decisions. Anita Bernstein, Minding the Gaps in Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 123 (2019).
5. Other robot systems that are more securely located in private law, such as the
systems for will preparation, are considered in another paper in this volume. Emily S. Taylor
Poppe, The Future is Bright Complicated: AI, Apps, and Access to Justice, 72 OKLA. L. REV.
183 (2019). These might also have analogous incentives to reach decisions that would
minimize the risk of challenge. But I focus here on robots whose legal decisions arise in the
area of regulatory compliance.
6. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1256 (2008) (describing the Colorado Benefits Management System, which incorrectly
denied benefits to eligible welfare applicants); Marc Cohan & Mary R. Mannix, National
Center for Law and Economic Justice’s SNAP Application Delay Litigation Project, 46
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 208, 211 (2012).
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For a market robot, such as TurboTax, the situation is reversed. A
decision that undercomplies with the law, perhaps by allowing certain
borderline expenses as trade or business tax deductions, could be
challenged by the government. A decision that overcomplies with the law,
for instance by disallowing borderline expenses as trade or business
deductions, will not be challenged by the government.
When private-market robots or government robots make the kind of legal
mistakes that I have described, sometimes we want to know how they make
their decisions because a valid legal process can persuade us to respect the
decisions themselves as final. For instance, reason-giving can show the
reasonableness or non-negligence of a private market decision. Or it can
show that a government decision followed constitutional due process
requirements or the Administrative Procedure Act.
Robots face a challenge in responding to requests for reason-giving
because robot decisions may not be transparent or explainable. When a
robot’s legal decision is challenged, the “transparency” or “explainability”
of the decision can provide a path to respecting the decision of a robot as
final and valid. If decisions are not considered explainable, robotic systems
may not be able to invoke the validity of their own internal process as a
way to defend their decisions. This may give robots, more than humans, the
incentive to avoid any request to explain why they did what they did.
Because of the difficulty robots may face in reason-giving, they may
have an incentive to generate decisions that run contrary to usual
expectations. Government robots may begin to interpret the law to include
fewer requirements and provide a more generous interpretation of the law.
Private-market robots may begin to interpret the law to include more
requirements and provide a less generous interpretation of the law. This is
because it is more difficult to challenge overcompliant private-market
decisions and undercompliant government decisions. Instead,
overcompliant private-market decisions (such as declining to claim a
borderline tax deduction) and undercompliant government decisions (such
as granting benefits without collecting all required information) tend to
stand as valid and final, simply because the paths available to challenge
them are limited or nonexistent.
Compliance robots face other incentives in addition to the incentive to
avoid legal challenge. For instance, market robots generally have a profit
incentive. If this profit incentive encourages a market robot to undercomply
with the law, then the incentive to avoid legal challenge may provide a
helpful offset, and reduce undercompliance rather than causing
overcompliance. On the other hand, if a market robot’s profit incentive
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encourages overcompliance with the law, for instance because users prefer
safe legal positions, then the incentive to avoid legal challenge may
increase the market robot’s tendency to overcomply. In the case of
TurboTax, for example, profit incentives may encourage the software to
break taxpayer confidentiality laws but comply with substantive tax law.7 I
do not mean to suggest that the incentive to avoid legal challenge is always
an overriding consideration, only that it is one consideration that helps
predict the direction of robot-made law.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the existing concerns in
the law literature about the transparency and explainability of automated
intelligent systems, or robots. Part II categorizes the legal mistakes of
automated intelligent systems and shows that mistakes of overcompliance
or undercompliance could be made by either a private-market robot or a
government robot. Part III uses the examples of negligence liability and
procedural due process for administrative decisions to illustrate how
explainability could enable the law to decide that a robot’s decision should
be respected as legal, even if it is mistaken. A conclusion follows.
I. Transparency and Explainability
Transparency and explainability are questions that arise when robots
make legal decisions. There are narrower and broader definitions of
“robot.” Some definitions say a robot is an “object.”8 Others define robots
to include intelligent automatic systems that arrive at results and take
actions without human intervention.9 I will use the broader definition here.
An automated system that independently makes legal decisions qualifies as
a robot under this broader definition. It is useful to categorize TurboTax, for
instance, as a robot.
Legal scholars and policy makers worry about the explainability of robot
legal decisions. A law in the European Union attempts to provide a “right to
explanation” of automatic legal decisions.10 Legal scholars struggle to
7. See Susan C. Morse, When Will a Tax Compliance Robot Follow the Law?, 1 OHIO
ST. TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (suggesting that tax software preparation programs may
violate taxpayer confidentiality law and comply with substantive tax law).
8. A. Michael Froomkin, Introduction to ROBOT LAW x, xi (Ryan Calo, A. Michael
Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016).
9. Mark A. Lemley & Brian Casey, Remedies for Robots (forthcoming 2019)
(advocating broader definition).
10. See Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection
Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76, 82 (2017) (arguing that the law does not succeed
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reconcile existing legal tools for validating decisions with the black-box
nature of automatic decisions. How can we determine the negligence of an
algorithm too complex for human processing or evaluate whether due
process is met when machine learning manipulates data to maximize the
correlation of different variables through a process very difficult or
impossible to reverse engineer? Legal scholars recommend access to the
inner workings and data inputs of automated systems as a solution to the
problem of explainability.11 Some suggest that the right approach is for law
to evolve and develop the expertise necessary to evaluate the quality of the
data input and machine-learning models used by automatic systems, just as
law has earlier developed the capacity to evaluate the quality of statistical
analysis.12 Others suggest that automated systems may prove unable to
fulfill law’s requirements for explainability.13
Some objects or goals of automated system explainability have been
identified in the scholarship that explores it. The goals involve reasongiving and providing tools that will help a rightful plaintiff develop her case
challenging the automated system’s legal result. But the function of
explainability—or not—in the development of the law created by robots
still deserves further study.
The question of explainability has to do with institutional competence, or
institutional settlement, which is to say the legal process issue of when we
will treat a decision made by a particular legal institution as a final and
lawful decision. Robots act as instruments of other existing institutions, in
particular the “fourth branch,” also known as administrative agencies;14 and
private ordering, which is sometimes called the “fifth branch,” especially
when it engages in explicit self-regulation.15
in part because it does not engage the question of whether the right relates to an “ex ante
explanation” of system logic or functionality or an “ex post” explanation of how a particular
decision was reached).
11. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 6, at 1305-13 (recommending “audit trails,” the release
of source code, testing suites and public participation in the building of automated systems).
12. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (2019) [hereinafter Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency] (citing
Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 640 n.14 (2017)).
13. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
14. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive
Branch, 94 YALE L. J. 1766, 1766 (1985) (citing use of the term “fourth branch” in
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
15. See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private
Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 165 (1989).
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Existing law helps us see when robot decisions—whether by fourthbranch, or government, robots or fifth-branch, or private-market, robots—
will be open to challenge and when we will respect them as final without
giving any avenue for challenge. We care about explainability when
decisions are open to challenge, because explainability determines the
ability of a robot to give reasons that may persuade us to accept its decision,
even if a different institution, like a court, might make a different decision.
Generalizing the question in this way allows us to observe the vulnerability
of robot decisions that are (i) not explainable and (ii) open to challenge.
II. A Typology of Robot Legal Mistakes
A. Market and Government Robots, Overcompliance and Undercompliance
Mistakes
This Part seeks to show that robots’ legal mistakes can go in different
directions. In other words, mistakes can be overinclusive or underinclusive.
I use the example of compliance with an environmental emissions
regulation to argue that either overcompliance or undercompliance mistakes
could be made by either a government robot or a private-market robot. That
is, a fourth-branch administrative agency or government robot could either
overcomply, by restricting emissions too tightly, or undercomply, by
allowing too much pollution. Likewise, a fifth-branch private ordering or
market robot could allow either too little or too much pollution.
The below two-by-two matrix summarizes the mistakes a robot could
make in interpreting a regulation that allows a certain emissions level for a
certain pollutant. The robot’s task in this example involves legal judgment
calls at one or more steps in its compliance process. For instance, the robot
might measure source data about the pollutant, including making decisions
about the validity of the data. Or, the robot might compare the data to the
permitted emissions level to see if the emissions were “compliant,” perhaps
translating continuous data about emissions to a standard written using a
different measurement unit. Or, the robot might face a pollutant with a
somewhat different chemical makeup than that mentioned in guidance.
Other judgment calls might present when the robot prepares and submits a
report to the government verifying compliance or admitting noncompliance.
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Table 1: Undercompliance/Overcompliance
in Market/Government Robots
Market robot
Undercompliance

Overcompliance

Government robot

(1)

(3)

Allows more pollution
than the law permits.

Allows more pollution
than the law permits.

Remedy: Government
enforcement. More likely
to be challenged.

Remedy: Requires
standing, varies with
subject area. Less likely to
be challenged.

(2)

(4)

Restricts pollution more
than the law requires.

Restricts pollution more
than the law requires.

Remedy: Private law. Less
likely to be challenged.

Remedy: Regulated party
challenge to government
decision. More likely to be
challenged.

The matrix reveals four types of mistakes: (1) market undercompliance;
(2) market overcompliance; (3) government undercompliance; and (4)
government overcompliance.
Category (1), market undercompliance, is perhaps the easiest to
understand. It makes sense that a robot designed by and for the private
market would pursue the goal of undercompliance. Classic economic theory
suggests that a person subject to the law will undercomply to save
compliance costs so long as the probability of getting caught is less than
one hundred percent.16
16. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 198-99 (1968) (considering situation where penalties not increased to offset imperfect
enforcement).
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Category (4), government overcompliance, is also straightforward. When
government administrators are charged with implementing the law, they
may play it safe by requiring more than is strictly necessary under the law.
For instance, government may use safe-harbor guidance to describe
behavior that will definitely and clearly comply.17
Category (3), government undercompliance, is predicted by the theory of
public choice and the idea of capture. An industry group, such as a group of
firms that produce a pollutant, might lobby a government agency to adopt a
sympathetic interpretation of the law when the agency programs a legal
compliance robot or chooses the data set on which the robot will base
decisions.18 Capture and undercompliance could result.
Category (2) describes market overcompliance. It suggests, in other
words, the existence of a phenomenon that we can call reverse capture,
which causes market robots to make decisions that favor the government. A
market robot might prefer to make conservative decisions about the content
of the law for several reasons. One possibility is that transaction costs are
lower because the robot can directly import government guidance, which
may have conservative or safe-harbor bent.19 Or, the market robot’s users
may prefer less aggressive positions.20 Or, the market robot’s users may not
know that the robot is taking less aggressive positions.

17. See Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1383,
1392-94 (2016) (giving examples of safe-harbor guidance).
18. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 135, 142 (James W. McKie ed., 1974) (describing a
“small, relatively homogeneous beneficiary group” that “impos[es] unobtrusive costs on
large numbers of others”).
19. See Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax
Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 189, 229-31 (2017) (giving examples of TurboTax repeating
government guidance verbatim); Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Z. Osofsky, Constituencies and
Control in Statutory Drafting: Interviews with Government Tax Counsel, 104 IOWA L. REV.
1291, 1317-18 (2019) (reporting that statutes and guidance are often drafted with a tax
software audience in mind).
20. There could be a division of opinion within an institution like a firm about the right
level of under- or overcompliance. For instance, less risk-averse shareholders might prefer
undercompliance, while more risk-averse employees in the compliance department of a firm
might prefer overcompliance. Cf. GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE,
RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 168-69 (2014) (describing the developing
multidisciplinary “compliance industry” and the emergence of a new compliance
profession).
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B. Challenging Robots’ Legal Mistakes
The type of mistake made by a robot influences the avenue that can be
used to challenge the mistake. Market overcompliance mistakes and
government undercompliance mistakes are less likely to be challenged.
Market undercompliance mistakes and government overcompliance
mistakes are more likely to be challenged.
Consider category (2) mistakes, where the market robot overcomplies
with the law, and, for example, emits too little pollution. There is no publiclaw mechanism to correct this problem of overcompliance. However, a
private-law mechanism could reverse this decision for the future. For
instance, a contract between a robot and a user could require the robot to
take more aggressive positions, or different legal-compliance robots could
market different levels of compliance.
With respect to category (3), government undercompliance, it is
sometimes the case that no challenge is possible. Even if a tax provision
illegally favors a particular group of taxpayers, other taxpayers (whose
taxes presumably will increase as a result) generally lack standing to
challenge the provision directed at the favored group.21 In contrast, in
environmental law, avenues exist for the general public to claim standing
and challenge such examples of government undercompliance, 22 even
though these avenues may be narrow.23
There is generally an established procedure for challenging category (1),
market undercompliance. This avenue is government enforcement. Partly
because of limited resources, government underenforces the law. But the
process is there and might be made more efficient if the government
directly targeted market legal-compliance robots.24

21. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (denying standing to a
taxpayer objecting to provision of tax law). See generally Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers,
69 TAX L. REV. 617 (2016). But see generally Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A
Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L. J. 771 (2003)
(reporting cases of taxpayer standing in municipal tax cases).
22. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504-06 (2007) (failure of EPA to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528
U.S. 167, 173-74 (2000) (failure of government regulator to challenge corporation’s
violation of Clean Water Act).
23. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (requiring a
“concrete and particularized” “injury in fact,” a “causal connection,” and the capacity of a
court decision to redress the harm).
24. See generally Susan Morse, Government-to-Robot Enforcement, 2019 U. ILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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Another mistake likely to be challenged is type (4), government
overcompliance—when the government robot requires more of a regulated
party than the law does. Examples of government robots improperly
denying welfare benefits25 or allegedly terminating a public-school
teacher26 fall into this category. If the harm is big or salient enough, the
individual harmed by the government decision has an incentive to challenge
it.
III. When Are Robot Decisions Final, Even if They Are Mistaken?
A. Explainability and Finality of Robot Decisions
When an institution—like the federal or a state government, the
executive, a court, a regulatory agency, or private ordering—makes a
decision or takes an action, the law faces a choice. One option is to leave
the decision or action alone, thus implicitly respecting it as legal. Another
option is to provide an avenue to challenge the decision.27
We can observe this pattern in the categories of decisions described
above. For market robots, undercompliance mistakes might be challenged
by the government. But overcompliance mistakes are unlikely to be
challenged.
For government robots, the pattern is reversed. Overcompliance mistakes
might be challenged by aggrieved regulated parties. But undercompliance
mistakes are less likely to be challenged, despite the existence of narrow
theories of standing in areas such as environmental law.
Transparency and explainability help us decide whether the action or
decision is lawful and final. They have a role when a robot’s action or
decision is challenged. For instance, they are relevant when a market robot
makes an undercompliance mistake and faces government enforcement.
Transparency and explainability are also relevant when a government robot
makes an overcompliance mistake and faces a challenge from a regulated
party. Especially without explainability, market robots will be poorly

25. Citron, supra note 6, at 1256 (describing a state government automated law system
that incorrectly denied benefits to eligible welfare recipient).
26. See, e.g., Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
27. This choice is one object of Hart and Sacks’ classic investigation of the sources of
law and their idea of institutional settlement. See HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 1, at 158
(“What is each of [the various U.S. lawmaking institutions] good for? How can it be made to
do its job best? How does, and how should, its working dovetail with the working of the
others?”).
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equipped to defend the validity of undercompliance mistakes, and
government robots will be less able to defend the validity of
overcompliance mistakes. Thus, there is an incentive for robot legal
decision makers to favor the government if they are private market robots
and to favor the private market, or regulated parties, if they are government
robots.
The claim is not that this incentive to avoid legal challenge will control
robot legal decisions. For instance, it may only partly counteract a market
robot’s incentive to profit by violating the law. The goal here is simply to
observe the incentive to avoid legal challenge and to state its
counterintuitive bent. Robots will face this incentive especially if they
cannot explain their actions, because a lack of explainability makes it more
difficult to defend an action under familiar legal standards.
B. Applying a Negligence Standard to Market Undercompliance
Private ordering, or the market, is sometimes labeled the “fifth branch”
of government, particularly when it takes the form of an institution that
seeks to self-regulate. This label appears to place private ordering after the
legislature (the first branch), the executive (second), the judiciary (third),
and government bureaucracy (fourth). Nevertheless, private ordering
typically comes first in time when new legal issues are presented. That is,
private ordering initially determines who shall bear liabilities and make
payments and enjoy benefits, and it is the role of the other branches to limit
or change those private decisions.
The Hart and Sacks treatment of the capacity of legal process to validate
institutions’ legal decisions begins with private ordering.28 The authors’
setup is to investigate the government’s role in limiting the market
decisions that will be respected as lawful, or in helping with gap-filling
when private agreements are incomplete. They include one private-ordering
case involving a railroad that required a cattle drover to waive all rights to a
negligence claim in exchange for the drover’s “free” transport aboard the
train that also carried the stock in his charge.29 Citing the railroad’s
common-carrier status and the greater power of the railroad relative to the
customer, the Supreme Court refused to allow the railroad to waive
negligence liability.

28. Id. at 7 (“[T]he individual himself, acting alone or in concert with other private
individuals, is in the front line of decision, and this fact is of far-reaching importance in the
whole theory of social ordering.”).
29. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 384 (1873).
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Similarly, commentators who study automated systems have begun to
suggest that platforms should bear responsibility for some unreasonable
decisions. Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes, for instance, make this
suggestion with respect to platform liability for terrorist messages or
exploitative sexual material on the internet.30 The issue is covered by § 230
of the Communications Decency Act, which as enacted provides that
platforms like websites or search engines will not be considered “the
publisher or speaker of any information provided.”31 Citron and Wittes
describe the judicial interpretation of this provision as a First Amendmentbased permission for sites advertising illegal commercial sex or spreading
defamatory rumors.32 They recommend a statutory amendment that would
require “reasonable steps to prevent . . . unlawful use of . . . services” as a
prerequisite to the conclusion that a platform did not act as a publisher or
speaker.33
If this recommendation became law, it would become necessary to
decide what “reasonable steps” means. The authors help by giving a good
example and a bad example. The good example is Twitter, which takes
seriously “complaints that accounts are being run by designated foreign
terrorist groups.34” The number of pro-terrorist accounts removed by
Twitter approaches 400,000. The bad example is Omegle, which apparently
only warns users that when it matches users with “new friends,” those new
friends might be sexual predators.35 If Omegle responded to complaints of
predation by investigating and removing accounts, the authors suggest,
perhaps it too would be eligible for immunity from liability under § 230.36
If the idea of “reasonable steps” followed the established path of other
similar inquiries in law, it would require some understanding of how the
automated system processes the complaints. What criteria does a platform
use to determine that an account should be removed? Does it automatically
remove an account in response to a complaint, or does it investigate the
particulars of the charge? Understanding how the platform compares the
evidence in a complaint to the content of the law prohibiting certain
30. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).
32. Citron & Wittes, supra note 30, at 413-14 (giving examples of providers granted
immunity under § 230).
33. Id. at 419.
34. Id. at 418.
35. Id. at 401.
36. Id. at 417-18.
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behavior on the internet presumably forms the content of a “reasonable
steps” analysis. It is like comparing a particular doctor’s actions to accepted
practice to determine whether the doctor demonstrated a reasonable degree
of care, skill, and learning in connection with a malpractice case.
Without such an analysis of the reasonableness of a platform’s
procedures, which requires some degree of explainability of its automatic
decisions, what would happen? In the absence of such information about its
process, perhaps the platform would not be able to defend a decision to
leave an account open after receiving a complaint. It might look instead for
a way to avoid legal challenge altogether. If the platform could avoid legal
challenge by showing that it always takes down content in response to
complaints, perhaps it might adopt an automatic takedown policy instead.37
If no one sues the platform to complain about removing content, then a
policy of overcompliance via automatic takedown is an attractive option.
Such a policy would cause the law to drift in the opposite direction from its
initial bias. The platform’s content might become too censored, rather than
not censored enough.
C. Applying Procedural Due Process Requirements to Government
Overcompliance
Administrative agency bureaucrats participate in the “fourth branch” of
government. They present the question of when to respect agency legal
decisions as final determinations of law. Administrative procedure plays an
important role in this issue. For example, procedural due process precedent
requires not only fair procedures but also procedures that minimize error.38
Cary Coglianese and David Lehr provide an optimistic view of how
administrative procedure law and automatic regulation might together
evolve to allow explainable robot decision-making that satisfies procedural
due process requirements.39 They review the three-prong Mathews v.
Goldberg balancing test, which considers the private interest at stake; the
37. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness,
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1185-86 (2008) (noting
the problem of possible negative externalities resulting from the filtering and organizing of
search results by algorithms).
38. Reason-giving is an element of defending an administrative action against
Administrative Procedure Act claims, such as claims of arbitrary and capricious action, see 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018), as well as against constitutional claims such as procedural due
process claims.
39. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative DecisionMaking in the Machine Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1184-91 (2017) [hereinafter
Coglianese & Lehr, Regulating by Robot].
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risk of error as a result of the administrative procedure and the likely errorcorrection benefit of a proposed change; and the Government’s interest,
including the resources required to administer the law using different
procedures.40 Coglianese and Lehr point out that the first point (the private
interest) is “exogenous” to whether a government adjudication is made by
an algorithm or a human. The third, they say, will weigh in favor of using
efficient automatic or robotic adjudication.
The second Mathews point, relating to the risk of error and the
possibility that a different process would reduce errors still further, is the
hard one. In Coglianese and Lehr’s view, a government robot can and will
evolve to allow the validation and “cross-examination” of its automatic
decision-making process. If it does so, the government robot will have
achieved sufficient transparency and explainability to defend its procedures
and provide enough reasons to defend its decisions against regulated
parties’ charge of mistakes of overcompliance.41
The same authors42 refer to a recent Texas case about the firing of
Houston schoolteachers based on the results of a secret algorithm that
considered, among other factors, the test scores of a student in a teacher’s
classroom. The court denied the school district summary judgment on the
teacher union’s procedural due process claim. The results given by the
algorithm for a certain teacher could not be replicated to check for errors, in
part because the results for one teacher were related to the results for other
teachers, so that changing a data input for one teacher would affect
everyone else’s score.43
One question facing the Houston school district on this issue is whether
to engage or avoid the procedural due process question. It could perhaps
give plaintiffs access to the internal information and programming to allow
the adjudication of such a procedural due process issue. But it could also
change its decision-making process to reduce the chance of such a claim,
for instance by forgoing the interrelated ranking feature which now appears
to be part of its review process.
If the Houston school district chooses to defend its decision by sharing
information, it will be an example of government fulfilling the promise of
algorithmic governance by adjusting to the demands of existing law—that
is, by making its procedures explainable. A court could ease this process by
40. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
41. See Coglianese & Lehr, Regulating by Robot, supra note 39, at 1184-91.
42. See Coglianese & Lehr, Transparency, supra note 12, at 37-38.
43. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d
1168, 1172 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
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adopting a flexible and modern concept of reason-giving, as Coglianese and
Lehr recommend.
But the Houston school district could also choose the latter route, for
instance by abandoning its commitment to rank teachers relative to one
another, in order to make its decisions easier to explain and defend. This
latter, defensive route would cause a change in the development of the law.
For instance, it might increase teachers’ job security, because that change
would reduce the chance of challenge to government decisions about
teacher retention.
D. What If Robot Processes Are Not Explainable?
If robot processes are sufficiently transparent and explainable, then both
market robots and government robots may defend the legality and finality
of their decisions by showing the validity of their process. For instance,
market robots might persuade a court that their process of decision-making
is reasonable, or nonnegligent. Government robots might persuade a court
that their process of adjudicating a claim adequately guards against error.
If robot processes are not sufficiently transparent and explainable, then it
will be more difficult for market and government robots to defend their
decisions as legal and final. Automated systems will have an incentive to
make decisions that will not face legal challenge. Market robots would be
more likely to overcomply with the law, and government robots would be
more likely to undercomply with the law. This result is contrary to the usual
prediction that private ordering tends to undercomply with the law while
government guidance may overcomply.
Whether this counterintuitive prediction comes true depends on what
other incentives robots face. For instance, a private-market robot’s profit
motive is another important factor.44 The problem of explainability and the
incentive to avoid legal challenge may reduce, but not erase, a market
robot’s incentive to violate the law in order to increase profits. It might
offset, but not eliminate, tax preparation software companies’ incentive to
violate taxpayer confidentiality law. On the other hand, the incentive to
avoid having to explain results might exacerbate a market robot’s tendency
44. In addition, sometimes the robot’s customer is not the regulated party. In consumer
credit reports, the consumer is arguably the regulated party, since applicable rules determine
how her credit report should be generated. But the profit motive of a robot-generated credit
report runs to the banks that purchase the reports. See Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered
Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U.
PENN. L. REV. 363, 381-83 (2013) (noting that credit reporting agencies’ “main revenue
source is the [lenders] who purchase credit reports”).
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to overcomply, especially if overcompliance will not materially reduce user
revenue. It might increase tax preparation software companies’ tendency to
take safe positions under substantive tax law.45
In circumstances where a market robot overcomplies or a government
robot undercomplies because of the incentives described here, the question
may arise as to whether this new drift in the law is normatively good. Most
likely, the answer to this question will depend on context. For instance, take
the pollution example used to illustrate the different categories of robot
legal mistakes above in Part II. Context helps determine whether to favor a
move toward market overcompliance or government undercompliance.
Assume, for example, that a person believes that environmental law is
not strict enough, that is, that it allows too much pollution. Assume further
that private-market systems dominate the area of pollution-emissions
compliance. The person who prefers less pollution would welcome a result
that would cause a market robot to overcomply with the law and limit or
restrict pollution even more than required. This person may prefer
nonexplainability so that the market system cannot defend its emissions
decisions by proving that they are reasonable.
Now take the same person who prefers less pollution, but change the
hypothetical to assume that government robot systems, rather than market
robots, dominate the area of pollution-emissions compliance. Now, this
same person might prefer that government robots are sufficiently
transparent and explainable. Then, government can defend its decisions
against the challenge of a regulated party that asserts that the government
decisions are invalid because they cannot be explained. If the government
lacks this defense, it may decide to avoid challenges from regulated parties
by undercomplying rather than overcomplying with the law.
Another way to see the value of explainability is to observe that it would
protect existing pathways for different government institutions to provide a
check on each other. Government enforcement helps check market
decisions. Judicial review of regulated party challenges helps check
government decisions. If we think that the legal controversies resulting
from these checks benefit the development of the law, then we should
prefer to sustain them as methods of confirming institutional competence.
This in turn is a reason to encourage robots to develop ways of explaining
how they make decisions, and to encourage the law to develop ways of

45. See Morse, supra note 7 (explaining different tax software compliance incentives for
taxpayer confidentiality law compared with substantive tax law).
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understanding robots’ legal process. Otherwise, robot legal decisions may
develop in a way that avoids legal challenge altogether.
Conclusion
The questions presented by robots’ legal mistakes are familiar to legal
scholarship. They are part of the general inquiry about when we will accept
legal decisions, like those made through private ordering or administrative
action. Decision-making robots might be market robots or government
robots. In either category, they can make mistakes of undercompliance or
overcompliance.
Some robot mistakes are more reviewable than others. A market robot’s
overcompliance mistake or a government robot’s undercompliance mistake
is relatively unlikely to be challenged. On the other hand, government
enforcement can challenge a market robot’s undercompliance mistake, and
an aggrieved regulated party can object to a government robot’s
overcompliance mistake.
Explainability is relevant to the question of whether to accept a robot’s
decision as a final statement of the law. This is because explainability can
justify the process of decision as legitimate, for instance because it is
reasonable or nonnegligent. Explainability provides a pathway for
validating robot action.
If robot systems are not explainable, or if courts do not recognize their
way of explaining as legitimate under the law, then robots will be left
without this means of defending their actions. They may be more likely to
make counterintuitive decisions that will avoid the prospect of legal
challenge. For instance, subject to other relevant factors including the profit
motive of market robots, a lack of explainability is likely to encourage
market robots to overcomply and government robots to undercomply.
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